Emergencies arising from terrorist threats highlight the need for transportation managers to minimize the vulnerability of passengers, employees, and physical assets through incident prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery. Managers are seeking to reduce the chances that transportation vehicles and facilities will be targets or instruments of terrorist attacks and to be prepared to respond to and recover from such possibilities. By being prepared to respond to terrorism, each public transportation agency is simultaneously prepared to respond to natural disasters such as hurricanes, floods, and wildfires, as well as human-caused events such as hazardous materials spills and other incidents. In the last week of October 2001, the Transit Cooperative Research Program budgeted $2 million for security-related research in fiscal year 2002. This is the first volume of TCRP Report 86: Public Transportation Security, a series in which relevant information is assembled into single, concise volumes, each pertaining to a specific security problem and closely related issues. These volumes will focus on the concerns that transit agencies are addressing when developing programs in response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 , and the anthrax attacks that followed. Future volumes of the report will be issued as they are completed.
To develop this volume in a comprehensive manner and to ensure inclusion of significant knowledge, available information was assembled from numerous sources, including a number of public transportation agencies. A topic panel of experts in the subject area was established to guide the researchers in organizing and evaluating the collected data and to review the final document.
This volume was prepared to meet an urgent need for information in this area. It records practices that were acceptable within the limitations of the knowledge available at the time of its preparation. Work in this area is proceeding swiftly, and readers are encouraged to be on the lookout for the most up-to-date information.
Volumes issued under TCRP Report 86: Public Transportation Security may be found on the TRB website at http://www4.trb.org/trb/crp.nsf/All+Projects/TCRP+J-10. 
INTRODUCTION

The operational world of public transportation is complex and multifaceted. Public transportation systems in the United States include automated guideway, rail, bus, ferry and paratransit modes. Public transportation is a critical subset of the national transportation infrastructure and a major component of the economy. Surety of public transportation is largely reliant on the ability to rapidly and accurately identify and communicate threats against its passengers, employees, vehicles, and facilities. A series of working protocols for identifying and disseminating threat information to and among public transportation operators, security personnel, and law enforcement agencies to facilitate threat identification, response, and mitigation activities is presented. Included is a summary assessment of current practices and operational needs within the public transportation community, along with a suggested framework for an improved system.
Threat identification and dissemination is an essential element of homeland security. Whereas large-scale or otherwise significant attacks (both in terms of duration and scope) place public transportation infrastructure and national security at risk, even short-term disruptions can have significant operational, psychological (in terms of public and employee confidence), and/or economic impact. Devastation can extend to other vital sectors of the nation's critical infrastructure. Public transportation systems are interdependent with other critical infrastructures (especially the communications and information sectors), and the impact of an incident or event during service provision can have cascading effects because of the complexity and resulting multi-sector vulnerability. For example, most commuters use just-in-time arrival goals in planning their work trips. They know when they are required to be at work and take scheduled public transportation vehicles that will allow for on-time arrival. A serious incident involving the public transportation infrastructure would cause large numbers of employees to be late to work or to not arrive at work at all. This impact is reinforced, as their non-productivity would cause similar economic impacts to commerce partners.
Public transportation systems (passenger rail including subways, metros, light rail, commuter, and interurban rail) and transportation terminals (bus, rail, ferry, intermodal) are vulnerable to terrorist attacks such as a disruption to the transportation infrastructure, which includes various types of terrorism and sabotage. Disruptions directed towards public transportation systems can place communities and national security at risk. Significant economic losses and interruption of vital services are also a result of terrorist attacks. Public transportation is also susceptible to secondary impact from attacks directed against the energy, communications, and information infrastructures, as well as attacks on public facilities [e.g., the first and second World Trade Center attacks resulted in significant impact on the Port Authority Trans Hudson (PATH) and New York City (NYC) Subway systems].
Public transportation systems are vulnerable to attack or intentional disruption for a number of reasons 1 . Characteristics contributing to the vulnerability of public transport include:
❐ carrying a large number of people within enclosed spaces; ❐ following known or fixed routes during a predictable timeframe; ❐ having fixed access points; ❐ containing unique hazards (e.g., traction power, confined spaces, etc.) that complicate response; and ❐ being susceptible to systemic impacts.
Attacks against transport targets can be directed at casualty generation, disruption or both. Recent attacks targeting transport systems (by terrorists or criminal actors) include the 1994 Fulton Street firebombing on the NYC Subway, the derailment of the Amtrak Sunset Limited in Hyder, Arizona in 1995, the 1993 Long Island Rail Road (LIRR) shooting, the 1995 Tokyo Sarin attack by Aum Shinrikyo, the 1995-96 bombing campaign against the Paris Metro by the Groupe Islamique Arm (GIA), armed Islamic group, and the 1997 plot to bomb the Atlantic Avenue subway and Long Island Railroad (LIRR) station in Brooklyn. Ongoing attacks directed against Israeli buses and recent intelligence information (FBI and DOT advisories and alerts) regarding al-Qaeda interest in attacking US subways and employing chemical agents, combined with attempts to acquire chemical/biological/radiological/nuclear (CBRN) means to reinforce the viability of terrorist threats against public transportation. Attacks against public transportation systems or infrastructure can have significant impact in terms of lives and system status. Responding to such attacks will necessitate good intelligence and significant demands for information by decision makers and emergency responders. The presence of an opposing will, time constraints, and incomplete or conflicting information can be expected to complicate response, mitigation, and the decision-making process.
The transportation infrastructure, at its largest extent, includes a combination of privately and publicly held passenger and freight assets that should be addressed in totality. However, the public transportation sector is the only concern of this report. Public transportation systems include the guideways and roadways on which the various vehicles operate, the administrative, control, and maintenance facilities that support service provision, the passengers who ride the system, the employees who facilitate operation, and the Public Transportation Information Infrastructure (PTII) 2 . The PTII consists of transportation data, software, hardware, and communication technology.
The threat communication (identification and dissemination) mechanism described herein would form a critical component of the PTII as well as serve as a means of protecting the PTII and identifying threats against it and the public transportation infrastructure. In surface transportation, the emerging Intelligent Transportation System (ITS) component is another important element of the PTII.
A viable public transportation threat communication mechanism should be an integral component of an overarching, industry-wide consequence management architecture and provide for information surety.
Threat identification, threat management, and consequence mitigation are three elements of a robust approach to crisis management. All rely upon good information flow and the rapid identification and dissemination of threat knowledge and situational awareness to all potentially affected public transportation system operators, intelligence organizations, and law enforcement authorities, whereas maintaining a link with other infrastructure sectors [directly or through a collaborative threat information forum (TIF) such as InfraGard 3 ]. Information surety is a measure of the integrity, confidentiality, and accessibility of information and must be incorporated into this effort.
CURRENT PRACTICE AND OPERATIONAL NEEDS
Public transportation operators and security components (including sworn public transportation officers and local municipal police) currently receive threat and intelligence information from a variety of formal and informal sources. These include: 3 The InfraGard Program is an essential component of the National Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC) that conducts outreach and information sharing with the public and private sector owners and operators of critical infrastructures. The program establishes a mechanism for two-way information sharing about intrusion incidents and system vulnerabilities and provides a channel for the NIPC to disseminate analytical threat products to the private sector. The mission of the NIPC is to detect, deter, assess, warn, respond, and investigate unlawful acts involving computer and information technologies, both physical and cyber, that threaten or target critical infrastructures; manage computer intrusion investigations; support law enforcement, counterterrorism, and foreign counterintelligence missions related to cyber crimes and intrusion; support national security authorities when unlawful acts go beyond crime and are foreign-sponsored attacks on United States interests; and coordinate training for cyber investigators and infrastructure protectors in the government and private sector. Direct reports from employees or customers are also key sources of threat information. Often in the form of an alert, threat information is disseminated (though, not often formally) through a number of delivery systems (email, fax, surface mail, telephone, etc.) and varies in timeliness, accuracy, and utility value.
Threat identification is absolutely necessary for recognizing a potential attack targeting a specific public transportation system. Certain trends, as shown in Figure 1 , may serve as an early warning system to a possible security threat. Recognition of these trends may even prevent a coordinated attack against multiple public transportation systems, if discovered in time and communicated effectively to the other systems.
Identified Surveillance Attempts:
-casing -pre-attack reconnaissance
Pre-incident Indicators:
-propaganda/vandalism -direct threats -recent thefts (uniforms, keys, vehicles, equipment)
RECOGNITION OF TRENDS
Awareness of System Surroundings
FIGURE 1: RECOGNITION OF TRENDS
Awareness of current threat situations allows public transportation systems to allocate resources for security and counterterrorism efforts and to identify operational and security posture (such as measures to deter and prevent, or rapidly assess and mitigate an incident). This general awareness keeps decision makers informed so they can decide on whether to initiate any of the following actions:
❐ suspending or restricting service; ❐ alerting the public of possible threats; ❐ implementing patron security measures (such as reporting suspicious persons or packages); and/or ❐ conducting employee awareness briefings.
Historically, public transportation systems have shared threat information with varying levels of effectiveness.
For example, public transportation systems (or public transportation police forces) were previously surveyed in another Transit Cooperative Research Program (TCRP) project. 4 It was established that 55% maintained regular links with other public transportation systems regarding threat posture and 71%
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maintained on-going links with local, state, or federal law enforcement agencies with the specific intent of maintaining awareness of current threat. These are strong and positive levels of interaction. However, in today's post September 11 environment, it is suggested that every public transportation and paratransit system establish a strong working relationship with other public transportation systems in their region (and beyond); with private bus operators and other transportation providers (such as school bus operators); and with local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies.
Additionally, whereas 93% of respondent systems received threat/warning circulars from the FTA or USDOT/Office of Intelligence and Security (OIS), dissemination to key personnel at the managerial and operational levels was much lower, as shown in Figure  2 . This is not very reassuring, because the information received was not always communicated to the rank and file operations personnel who would have needed to take definitive action if warranted. 
COMMUNICATION OF THREATS SURVEY
As a component of the research associated with this Communication of Threats program, in April 2002, a survey instrument was generated and distributed to 39 public transportation systems 5 to determine the current sources of threat information they receive and the delivery mechanisms that would facilitate interaction with the technology currently deployed within their organization. From a total of 39 surveys sent, the MTA research team received responses from 12 transportation authorities including, Chicago, Cleveland, Dallas, Denver, Kenosha, WI, Miami, North Carolina, Northern Indiana, Sacramento, San Francisco, Washington, DC, and Utah.
5 The public transportation systems included in the survey are listed in Appendix B. It was part of the research methodology to survey the larger systems, because they tended to have security departments or a sworn police force as a major part of the public transportation system. The survey instrument and the transmittal letter are reproduced in Appendix C. The detailed survey results are located in Appendix F.
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Nearly all respondents (10) manage bus networks, whereas almost an equal number (9) coordinate paratransit and light rail systems. Only half of the respondents (six) manage their own police departments, whereas the remaining respondents supervise their own security system.
The MTA research team attempted to gather information on both the number of threat warnings as well as the anticipated threat incidents each year from 1998 to 2001. The terms Threat Warning and Actual Threat Incidents were confusing to many respondents. The few that reported on these events tended to focus the meaning to bomb threats (this may be due to the fact that the survey was conducted by the Terrorism Research Center and thus, respondents tried to respond to threats and incidents of terrorism). Nevertheless, bomb threats have historically constituted the largest segment of concern for public transportation operators; this can be expected to continue. Furthermore, all the elements of information analysis, threat dissemination, and course of action development facing decision makers in bomb threat situations are present in more complex or exotic threats. Comparing the tables from 1998-2000, incidents outnumbered threats two to three times each year. In 2001, mostly following the heightened alert after September 11, warnings and incident responses increased dramatically. Of the 12 respondents, the total number of threats quintupled to 24 in 2001, compared with the average of 5 from 1998-2000. Additionally, the number of threat incidents to which personnel were dispatched doubled to 25 in 2001, compared with the average (12.67) from 1998-2000.
Of the 12 surveys collected, only 1 public transportation body reported more than 4 warnings in a calendar year. Interestingly, one transportation authority received approximately 15 warnings directly after September 11, 2001 . No more than 10 incidents took place in any given year from 1998-2001 to which security personnel were dispatched.
SURVEY: ASSESSMENT OF CURRENT PRACTICES
The survey assessed current public transportation threat communication practices. Specifically, the survey:
❐ reviewed current sources of transportation threat communications; ❐ explored if and how the newly developed federal Homeland Security Advisory System (HSAS) has been integrated into transportation systems; ❐ surveyed the timeliness and utility of a variety of threat communication media; ❐ investigated how public transportation system security departments currently respond to threat advisories; ❐ questioned if security postures are coordinated with neighboring public transportation systems; and ❐ derived a list of public transportation authority positions responsible for determining threat levels to the system.
Nineteen threat communications sources were presented in the questionnaire. Respondents were asked to identify which sources their public transportation system utilized as well as to rate the importance of each source on a scale of 1 (least important) to 7 (most important). Interestingly, open source news broadcasts received the highest rating of importance (average score 6.22 among 9 respondents), almost a half point higher than the next highest source. FTA received an average importance rating of 5.80 among 10 respondents. Other important sources identified by survey participants include Local Law Enforcement (5.64 score, 11 respondents), Local Emergency Management (5.50 score, 10 respondents), and Training Opportunities (5.44 score, 9 respondents). All other sources received average scores below 5.00. The lowest scoring sources surveyed include the National Crime Information Center (3.78 score, 9 respondents), Office of Intelligence and Security (3.57 score, 7 respondents), and the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) (3.17 score, 6 respondents). Three other threat communication sources were identified including the California Anti-Terrorism Information Center (CATIC) (5 score, 1 respondent), state Office of Emergency Services (OES) (6 score, 1 respondent), and FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force (7 score, 1 respondent).
Regarding the newly developed Homeland Security Advisory System (HSAS), only half (six) of the respondents reported having been briefed about the system, and only two indicated that the HSAS had been integrated into their existing threat communication protocol. One survey participant noted that their formal threat protocol was still in development within their committee that meets twice per month to address terrorism issues. The respondent further reported that they anticipate using the HSAS threat level to determine adjustments in staffing, assignment of fixed posts at vulnerable points, etc. It should be noted that the survey was conducted approximately three months after the federal Office of Homeland Security first introduced their threat level system.
Next, the methods for threat communication, including cell phones, email, faxes, line phones, pagers/BlackBerry, and surface mail/postal service were all examined in terms of both timeliness and utility on a scale of 1 (slow/not useful) to 7 (fast/extremely useful). Line phones were identified as slightly more timely (6.17 average score) than cell phones (6.08 average score). Surface mail was described as the slowest (1.45 average score), whereas the other three media received average scores of approximately 4.5.
The survey then sought to determine if public transportation systems incorporate threat advisories into the operational status and security posture. Seven transportation networks responded positively and provided a variety of examples. Efforts listed include:
❐ post additional security or law enforcement personnel or secure resources based on nature of threat;
❐ upgrade threat status based on assessments; ❐ possible redeployment and increase of security personnel; ❐ heighten awareness of employees; ❐ use threat advisories to determine need for extra shifts, staffing vulnerable points, etc.; ❐ threat condition levels are established by standard operating procedures (general order); ❐ heightened state of alerts established; and ❐ secure critical sites.
When queried if a transport authority's security posture was subsequently coordinated with proximate or connecting public transportation systems, only two responded positively. Coordination was implemented by communicating with the police department or if asked by other systems. The surveyed public transportation authorities do appear to collect threats, but admitted little effort was made to proactively cooperate with other systems. At a minimum, this issue should be explored more and perhaps should be facilitated by future efforts.
Lastly, respondents identified the following positions as responsible for determining threat levels in their transportation systems:
❐ Chief of Police; ❐ Security Manager; ❐ Chief of Office of Safety and Security; ❐ Manager of System Security; ❐ President or Executive Vice President of Transit Operations; ❐ Director; ❐ Police Department Staff with advisory to District Staff; or ❐ currently developing threat assessment committee.
SURVEY: ASSESSMENT OF OPERATIONAL NEEDS AND PREFERENCES
Respondents were asked to rate four components of any proposed transportation threat communication system including message vetting and authentication, peer-to-peer communication, message archiving, and historical evaluation capabilities. The first two components were rated similarly, scoring 6.09 and 6.00 averages respectively. Historical evaluation was ranked next at 4.64, whereas message archiving was rated last at 3.73.
Since the questionnaire was designed to elicit input into the design of an integrated transportation threat communication system, the research instrument collected information on the preferred media to be included. Nine respondents suggested the Internet be incorporated into the system whereas seven would like to see both cellular and pager networks included in the design. Additional suggestions included two requests for landline phones and one note to add faxed distribution. The National Criminal Information Center (NCIC) and similar state systems were also mentioned.
Most (75%) respondents did believe a Web-based system would meet their needs, although three did not. One of the three indicated that a Web-based system would not entirely meet their needs. Eight respondents supported both a public and restrictedaccess website design as well as tiers of access (noting full access to local law enforcement such as municipal police and sworn officers of the public transportation system. One authority recommended the website should be for law enforcement only, not for general distribution. A variety of similar password/user identification procedures were provided by respondents including:
❐ secure and protected/monitored; ❐ name and password; ❐ user specific alpha-numeric codes with periodic renewals; and ❐ encrypted.
The survey concluded by requesting a variety of suggestions on topics for design of a new integrated transportation threat communication system. Those topics and the exact responses are listed below.
System Design
Respondents were asked to provide comments on desirable system attributes. Examples of the responses follow.
❐ "Easy and fast to user." ❐ "Simple and redundant." ❐ "Constantly upgraded." ❐ "Our dispatch uses phone as communication tool. We will be part of combined communications system with public safety in the future. We are a small transit system and utilize our local police and fire departments as our security eyes and ears."
Interoperability
Respondents were asked to provide comments on system interoperability. Examples of the responses follow.
❐ "Allow for ease of communication and/or integration with other agencies." ❐ "Make available all information sharing." ❐ "System should be 'user-friendly' to allow easy exchange of info with source and other similar agencies."
Information Surety (Operational Security)
Respondents were asked to provide comments on information surety and operational security. Examples of the responses follow.
Respondents emphasized tactical needs for message vetting and peer-to-peer communication, and left strategic archiving and trend analysis as lower priorities. A close examination of this section of the survey reveals that greater clarity was needed to distinguish between the communication of the threat from outside sources to the transportation system, and filtering and forwarding that threat information to vehicle operators as well as security and police personnel. Thus, it seems likely that respondents did not adequately consider the value of a Web-based network for system administrators, preferring, instead, to assess the impact of a proposed system at the individual operator levels. However, 75% of respondents fully supported the development of a web-based threat communication system.
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Rapid and accurate information sharing is a critical operational need for coping with and managing threats against public transportation systems. Public transportation police, security, and operations personnel need to be aware of threats directed against their systems at the earliest opportunity. This information is essential to formulating appropriate operational responses to protect public transportation passengers, employees, vehicles, and facilities. This process is referred to as a Threat Information Forum (TIF).
It is important for public transportation threat information to simultaneously move in three directions to ensure complete and effective communication. These are:
❐ top-down, including information provided from national intelligence such as the current Homeland Security Advisory System (HSAS), which rates the status and threat to the national transportation infrastructure;
❐ bottom-up, from public transportation police, security, and operational personnel, regarding actual and suspected local threat incidents that might indicate targeting or an impending attack; and ❐ lateral, shared among adjacent public transportation systems and interrelated infrastructure sectors, representing mutual security concerns and operational issues.
In order to facilitate information sharing among all levels, a framework for a TIF, common parameters, and protocols need to be established.
TIFs should be organized into three components to collect and disseminate three classes of information. The three component areas are as follows.
❐ Local public transportation threat user groups (TUGs) should be composed of designated persons at specific public transportation systems (e.g., management, operations, security, public transportation police, control center, and other key decision makers). Local TUGs should also include designated local partners such as adjacent or cooperating public transportation systems, local police and emergency management agencies, local InfraGard chapters, and/or local threat assessment and warning entities, such as regional terrorism early warning (TEW) groups and joint terrorism task forces (JTTFs). Individual users and agency representatives should register with their TUG. Each TUG would designate a group manager and threat officer responsible for managing their local user group and disseminating information within the group. Messages could be TUG-specific or disseminated to the national clearinghouse for broader dissemination. Individual TUG users would be designated a level of access to TIF products based upon their need to know.
❐ A national public transportation threat clearinghouse should be located within an appropriate federal agency such as the USDOT's OIS, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), the National Response Center (NRC) or the proposed Surface Transportation Information Sharing and Analysis Center (ST-ISAC) 6 . This node would be responsible for collecting, verifying, analyzing, and disseminating TIF products and messages to public transportation systems (which would be organized into TUGs), appropriate federal entities (such as the FBI and intelligence community), and other infrastructure sectors (perhaps the InfraGard program). Individual TUGs (and their designated users) would register with the national clearinghouse. This could facilitate dissemination of critical security messages to the entire forum, select TUGs, or individual users.
❐ Transportation and related infrastructure owners also need to be notified of significant threats. Key representatives of the broader transportation infrastructure and interdependent infrastructures have a need for information regarding specific crosscutting incidents and threats. It is suggested that the existing InfraGard program can be used to disseminate this information. Appropriate public transportation threat information could be disseminated from the national clearinghouse to these sectors through the network of local InfraGard chapters.
Whereas a centralized entity is required for analysis and coordination at the national level, the core component of the TIF should be the local public transportation TUGs. Any enabling technology for threat information assessment should ensure that TUGs have the capability to freely share information among themselves via mechanisms such as email, secure Web, and fax. In most cases, the requirement for rapid information sharing will require that information be shared in raw format, without vetting from a centralized analytical cell.
Individual users would be recommended and vetted by the local TUG. As an added security measure, each user would be screened through the InfraGard application and background check process, which is managed by the FBI. These measures would help ensure the integrity of the system and enhance operational security. This system should not be used for the dissemination of classified information.
The three suggested classes of information to be disseminated are advisories, alerts, and warnings. Each of these is described below.
❐ Advisories or incident reports should include changes in HSAS threat status, notification of incidents (including breaking news regarding specific public transportation attacks), information on public transportation system status (restricted service, suspended service, etc.), and information regarding observed terrorist tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs). Advisories would be informal in nature and could be disseminated locally within a TUG or through the national clearinghouse to other TUGs or infrastructure sectors. Dissemination of incidents regarding suspicious circumstances would only occur after analysis and deconfliction (deconfliction is a technical process of vetting and validating a specific threat to eliminate multiple reports about the same threat) with appropriate investigative authorities to ensure operational security and avoid compromising investigative and law enforcement activities. Advisories would generally be issued during low (green) or guarded (blue) HSAS conditions. They can also relate to incident-specific information during any HSAS condition. Advisories would be disseminated to users; incident reports would originate with individual users for assessment, collection, and dissemination by a TUG or the national clearinghouse.
❐ Alerts would be threat-specific messages informing a public transportation system or TUG of a higher threat potential or to anticipate and be on the look out (BOLO) for a specific actor or threat. Alerts would generally be issued during elevated (yellow) or high (orange) HSAS conditions.
❐ Warnings would be threat-specific messages regarding an imminent threat of attack against a specific target location or venue. Warnings would only be issued during severe (red) HSAS conditions to specifically designated users within the TIF, based upon user need to know. Generally, warning messages would be disseminated as a text with direction to contact or consult a secure mode of communication or authority for specific details.
Since rapid dissemination of information is essential, it is suggested that the TIF utilize and exploit as many modes of transmission as possible. For example, an individual user should be able to receive and transmit text messages via several redundant pathways such as mobile phone, pager, two-way message unit, fax, phone, and email to ensure timely and accurate notification.
TECHNOLOGIES FOR THREAT INFORMATION DISSEMINATION
Several commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) solutions could be assembled and customized to create a system that facilitates the exchange of threat information among public transportation systems. The suggested implementation would be to create a secure portal-like content management system that interfaces with a commercial-grade database program. This portal would be capable of collecting and disseminating threat information using multiple communication mechanisms. A notional representation of information flow is provided in Figure 3 .
The portal should reside on the Internet, thereby ensuring a maximum coverage profile. However, access should be restricted to authorized personnel and protected by username or password combinations. Furthermore, users should be subjected to application and credential verifications similar to, or in coordination with, the InfraGard program.
It is suggested that the solution also provide for segmentation or enclave capabilities to allow for user communities to exchange threat information at federal, state, regional, and local levels. This would facilitate local information exchange whereas preventing information overload at the stakeholder level. These local enclaves, including TUGs, could also establish liaisons with other local or regional intelligence efforts (i.e. terrorism early warning groups) to maximize information exchange. 
SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS
Suggestions regarding the system functional requirements for a public transportation information exchange system are presented in the subsections that follow.
SCALABLE INFRASTRUCTURE DESIGN
The system should be designed using a scalable architecture approach that allows for the TIF portal to be implemented at a cost-effective scale and then grow as more public transportation authorities become involved. This scalable approach would also allow for smaller TIF portals to be established at the regional level that are then tied together by a centralized portal housed within an analytical center staffed to perform analysis and facilitate information exchange at the national level. Figure 4 provides an overview of a potential distributed model.
DATABASE STORAGE
Threat advisories, alerts, and warnings should be stored indefinitely in a commercialgrade database that allows for the interactive search and retrieval of records. Aggregating the data in one place would allow analysts to derive trends and conduct historical analysis. The system should also be capable of supporting information technology industry best practices for robustness and reliability. 
FIGURE 4: DISTRIBUTED IMPLEMENTATION MODEL
MULTI-LEVEL AND MULTI-TYPE INPUT MECHANISMS
The portal should accept multiple types of information from all participating entities and categorize the information for analysis accordingly. At a minimum, input should be accepted via email and secure Web-based origins. Additionally, a Web spider capability for checking relevant websites for changes and new information would be desirable. Support for information segregation by enclave or geographic region is suggested as is a capability for segregation of information specific to each public transportation mode (e.g., heavy rail, subway, commuter rail, light rail, rubber-tired trolley, over-the-road coach, large bus, small bus, paratransit vehicle, automated guideway public transportation vehicle, MagLev, or others).
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The portal should be capable of distributing advisories, alerts, and warnings via multiple dissemination mechanisms, based on the type of information being disseminated and the established user profile. In addition, the portal should allow information to flow freely among all members of a TUG, therefore providing for real-time critical information exchange.
For maximum effectiveness, the portal should be capable of pushing information via the following interfaces.
❐ Email. The portal should be capable of sending broadcast messages to all users and also capable of sending messages to users based upon their preferred profile. For example, a user might want to receive alert and warning information to a public transportation workplace email address, and only warning messages to a personal email address. Email messages should be distributed in plain text, with all fields clearly contained within the message. In addition, messages should be digitally signed to help ensure authenticity.
❐ Two-way pagers or BlackBerry 7 devices. The portal should be capable of sending broadcast messages via two-way pager or BlackBerry devices.
❐ Pagers. The portal should be capable of sending truncated messages (within certain character lengths) to alpha-numeric pagers.
❐ Facsimile. The portal should be capable of sending broadcast fax messages (e.g., by using an Internet to fax gateway).
❐ Web pull. The portal should provide a secure Web interface allowing users to review threat information, establish their preferred communication profile, and upload threat reports to their public transportation system. ❐ Telephone or mobile phone. The portal should be capable of distributing prerecorded messages via voice telephone communications to land and mobile telephone numbers. Given the potential associated costs, this capability would only be utilized for warning messages. Digital voice messages should also be sent.
MESSAGE CONTENT
Each threat message (advisory or incident report, alert, or warning) would be stored in the database and disseminated based upon user profiles, geographic location, and type of message. Each message should include, at a minimum, the following data:
❐ originating entity; ❐ originating user; ❐ date or time of message; ❐ type of message (advisory/incident report, alert, warning); ❐ details (size, activity, location, unit, time, equipment of threat entity or actor, TTPs); ❐ scope of dissemination (e.g., TUG, National Infrastructure Sectors); ❐ dissemination restrictions (e.g., operational security considerations, no public release, public safety sensitive); ❐ recommended action (e.g., information only, contact specific authority, BOLO, implement security measures); and ❐ duration and/or expiration of threat or condition.
SUPPLEMENTAL ISSUES
In evaluating any potential framework for the communication of threats, there are several supplemental issues that must be addressed and resolved. In addition to addressing where and how the TIF is managed, other issues surrounding legal liability and Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) responsibilities must also be researched.
It is recommended that communications be established with entities such as existing ISACs within the telecommunication and finance sectors and the FBI InfraGard administrators.
It will also be important to obtain community buy-in regarding the proposed framework and its implementation. It is recommended that a series of focus groups or workshops be conducted with representative members of the surface transportation community to drive the development of technical specifications and an implementation methodology that will help ensure the success of the proposed system. The workshops should also be used to determine the levels and types of analysis and vetting that should be performed against threat information prior to distribution. In some cases, especially among TUGs, there is a requirement for rapid dissemination that must be balanced with the requirement for vetted and accurate information.
CONCLUSION
The communication of threats framework suggested in this discussion would establish flexible, easy-to-implement TIFs for collecting, assessing, and disseminating threats to US public transportation systems and the broader US transportation infrastructure. This framework, relying on local public transportation system enclaves, or TUGs, combined with a national clearinghouse linked to the existing national InfraGard program, and any Information Sharing and Analysis Center (ISAC), would enable rapid, networked dissemination of threat information in a manner consistent with accepted principles of information surety.
Whereas it is important to note that technology is an enabler for rapid threat information sharing, technology should not be seen as a replacement for human analysis. To provide appropriate vetting, aggregation analysis, and coordination at both the national and local levels, a human analytical component is required. However, local public transportation authorities have a genuine requirement for rapid threat information transfer independent of a vetting or analytical process. The proposed portal concept allows for these two critical functional requirements to be met in one system. Information can be rapidly and automatically shared among TUGs, and information can be collected and analyzed to derive trends and extend information sharing outside a particular TUG as required.
One of the objectives of this research task order was to establish a framework for a communication of threats system. This has been accomplished, and the performance specifications have been initially developed. The suggested next steps to be accomplished regarding the development of the national system are more intense and summarized in Appendix E. They are presented briefly and could be further refined in the event TCRP would like to move beyond the limits of this initial effort.
This framework is dependent on the utilization of existing technology to keep costs low and ensure compatibility with existing communication capabilities within public transportation systems. The most significant costs will be associated with the development of the TIF system that ties the existing technologies together to effectively share threat information. However, if a given transportation system does not have access to the Internet, a public switched phone system for voice and fax, cellular communications, or pagers, there will be a cost of entry for the system to acquire the required technology components. 8 8 If an overall scalable architecture system were already developed and available, the cost to tie in by each public transportation system without access to existing technology at the very basic level might be $5,000. Considering that there are approximately 450 systems providing both fixed-route bus and complementary paratransit modes, as required by the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and approximately 4,000 rural and community transportation systems, the approximate basic tie-in costs to the public transportation industry might be approximately $25 million. As the overall system incorporates additional capabilities and the public transportation systems increase their sophistication with respect to the level of interface with the national system, the costs would be expected to increase. The incremental costs might be $15-$25 million for each additional step beyond the basic tie-in, considering that many of the smaller rural and community transportation systems may never expand their local capability beyond the base level. 
APPENDIX A: ACRONYM LIST
Purpose of the Survey
The purpose of this survey is to evaluate the requirements of the transit environment to develop a series of protocols for event reporting and profiles for how information should be distributed. Several transit operators are currently participating in this effort with a goal to derive a series of working protocols and information flow diagrams detailing when and how threat information should be disseminated and how to recognize trends that might be indicative of a coordinated attack against multiple transit systems. (This process used for protocol development mirrors an earlier effort utilized by law enforcement agencies to develop protocols for response and dissemination of terrorism threat data). Our goal is to determine the current information sharing mechanisms and threat information needs of transit operators and security (including police) providers. The survey will also attempt to determine preferences for system design, interoperability, and information surety (operational security). 
Survey Instructions
TRANSMITTAL LETTER
Dear Sir:
We are conducting a survey to evaluate the requirements of the transit environment to develop a series of protocols for event reporting and profiles for how information should be distributed.
This survey is supporting a research task order from the Transit Cooperative Research Program (TCRP), a unit of the Transportation Research Board (TRB) of the National Academy of Sciences. Additionally, it fits within a larger effort to conduct research in responding to the transportation sector's homeland security needs.
Several transit operators are currently participating in this effort with a goal to derive a series of working protocols and information flow diagrams detailing when and how threat information should be disseminated and how to recognize trends that might be indicative of a coordinated attack against multiple transit systems. (This process used for protocol development mirrors an earlier effort utilized by law enforcement agencies to develop protocols for response and dissemination of terrorism threat data).
Our goal is to determine the current information sharing mechanisms and threat information needs of transit operators and security (including police) providers. The survey will also attempt to determine preferences for system design, interoperability, and information surety (operational security).
Survey results will be reviewed to determine the viability of developing surface transportation threat protocols and corresponding threat dissemination systems. The research team for this effort is comprised of John Sullivan, Matthew Devost and James Kirkhope (survey point of contact).
Please feel free to contact us with any questions or comments. I will follow up shortly with a phone call to confirm receipt of the attached survey.
